Realty-based Indicators of Chicago's Balance Sheet

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Balance Sheet Approach to Reflect Municipal Solvency

Key questions

- What is "insolvency" or "dysfunctionality" for a city?
 - Bond default/inability to borrow?
 - Inability to provide services/fulfill its mandates?
 - Value of assets within its boundaries are zero (valuecreating residential and commercial activity are nil)?
 - Some may argue that political/institutional constraints or relations also are a determinant
- In either case, I might argue that a balance sheet tally may be helpful in assessing insolvency now and future
 - Further, many indicators may be useful in assessment and forecast, but property value very good asset to reflect current situation and prospects

Municipal Balance Sheet

Assets

- Financial assets/cash
- Building, equipment and land
- Public capital (infrastructure)

Other?

- Value of real property within boundaries
- Other business activities/income streams (with (taxable/reachable) nexus?)
 - E.g. retail, tourism, commuter earnings
- Goodwill, shared responsibility, and intergovernmental revenue streams from overlying or sponsoring government, i.e. state govt.

Liabilities

- Service responsibilities/mandates
- Debt
 - Unfunded pension liability
 - Other post-retire benefits

Other?

- E.g. Constraints on borrowing or revenue or effective governance as reflected by chronic or structural deficits?
- Tax flight sensitivity
- Political gridlock & lack of social capital

Income (P&L) Statement

Revenues/income

- Own-source taxes and fees
- Inter-governmental revenues and grants-in-aid
- Interest and rental income on assets
- "Capital gains"
 - On public and private assets
 - Changes instit. Constraints
 - Changes future service needs
 - Changes future revenue streams

Expenditures

- Services
 - E.g. "normal cost of pensions", wages, contracted services)
 - New obligations for current services (e.g. OPEBs)
 - Depreciation of physical assets
 - "Capital losses"
 - Ditto,

Traditional Fiscal Indicators can be reflected in balance sheet approach

- High/climbing cost population for service provision (e.g. poverty or high percent school-age)
- High/climbing cost/prices of service provision (e.g. undue unionization or rising crime, flight of pop. tax base)
- Ongoing sale of assets and use of one-time revenue sources
- Growing borrowing to meet current service obligations/rising costs of borrowing
- Inordinate borrowing and/or revenue-raising constraints
- Political gridlock/inability of cooperation in development


Property value may reflect most portions of the balance sheet and city's solvency

- -- actively traded
- -- forward looking
- -- widely reachable/liquid by city govt.
- -- much of it is immobile (like equity)

Single-Family Housing Market (OK, It is far from perfect.)

S&P/Case-Shiller Home Prices

(Index: Jan. 2000=100)



Evidence in favor of property value indicator


- Are fiscal liabilities (fully) capitalized? Past studies
 - Stadelmann/R. Eichenberger (Int. Tax Public Finance, 2013)
 - Capitalization substantial (Swiss Cantons) but varies with est. strategy
 - D. Epple et al. (Public Choice, 1981)
 - Municipal Pension Funding: Pittsburgh and suburbs
 - Mixed results: Overcap if exclude city of Pittsburgh;
 none otherwise
 - William Wheaton (National Tax J., 1984) full capitalization
 - John McDonald (National Tax J., 1993) mostly capitalized
 - R. McKay (National Tax Journal, 2014)
 - "Announcement study" in San Diego
 - Overcapitalization

Why test this out on Chicago v. Detroit?


-- Is Detroit a Benchmark?

Property market collapse coincides with

- -- Service provision near zero
- -- Gridlock apparent (political disarray, little local intergovt. cooperation, state gov't at odds (e.g. Emergency Financial Management)
- -- Taxable reach/ local resources exhausted (intergovernmental resources, too)
- -- Sharp flight/sensitivity of tax base fairly obvious



Yet, popular media couldn't refrain from comparing with Chicago



Avoid Chicago's Bonds: It Could Be the Next Detroit



Residents Abandoning Chicago: Is It Following in Detroit's Footsteps?

Illinois' sources of revenues are leaving as government employees keep demanding more, more, more.




Scott Shackford | Mar. 25, 2016 12:40 pm

Some Measures of Real Property Values: Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee (Is Chicago "Detroit"?)

Annual Average Home Selling Price - Detroit


Woodward Corridor, East Riverfront, and Detroit

(\$000s current dollars per capita)



^{*} Source: Paul Traub's calculations using MLS data from Realcomp II LTD. Includes single family residential and condominium sales.


Detroit Jurisdiction Real Estate Sales Data - by Type of Financing Percent of Total Reported Residential and Condo Only



_	Percent of Total					
		Conventional	Land			
	Cash	Mortgage	Contracts	All Other	Total	
2005	44.1	48.7	0.8	6.4	100.0	
2006	44.9	49.3	0.7	5.1	100.0	
2007	68.0	28.4	0.6	3.0	100.0	
2008	88.5	6.8	0.4	4.3	100.0	
2009	94.0	2.1	0.5	3.4	100.0	
2010	91.4	2.2	1.4	4.9	100.0	
2011	92.5	2.6	1.7	3.2	100.0	
2012	92.6	2.4	1.7	3.3	100.0	
2013	90.1	4.3	1.7	3.9	100.0	
2014	82.0	10.6	2.9	4.6	100.0	
2015	76.0	12.6	7.3	4.2	100.0	
Apr '16 YTD	74.4	12.9	8.8	3.9	100.0	

^{*} Source: RealComp


Estimated Market Values: Three Cities



^{*} Market values for Detroit were estimated by multiplying assessed values reported in CAFRs by 2. Chicago market values reported by the Civic Federation.

Milwaukee values are equalized assessed values.


Chicago and Detroit Estimated Market Values



 $[*] Sources: Detroit\ Certified\ Annual\ Financial\ Reports\ and\ The\ Civic\ Federation.$

Estimated Real Estate Values of Large Cities


(\$ thousands per capita, 2013)



^{*} Sources: Individual city comprehensive annual financial reports

Sources of urban revival....

Office Vacancy Rates: Downtown Areas




^{*} Source: CB Richard Ellis

Central Chicago Gains HQs

"Over 50 since 2001..."


Companies making big moves from suburbs to Chicago

More than 10,000-square-foot rentals. Hover over a line to see the company and where they moved from. Click a suburb or downtowr location to see companies that left. Suburb bubbles are sized based on number of companies that left.



Source: *Chicago Tribune*

- From suburbs, e.g. McDonalds (2016), Motorola Mobility and Solutions, United Air, Walgreens, Sara Lee, Hilshire Brands...
- From elsewhere, e.g. Oscar Meyer (Madison), GE Healthcare (London), Boeing (Seattle), ConAgra (Omaha, MeadeJohnson Nutrition (Evansville), ADM (Decatur), Caterpillar (Peoria), Kraft-Heinz (Pittsburgh), CLAYCO (St. Louis)



Economic Perspectives, Vol. 34, 4th, No. 4, 2010 "Educational Attainment and Household Location: The Case of Chicago's Lakefront," By William Sander, William Testa

How do cities' positioning with respect to property value change if we consider explicit debt liabilities, hypothesizing that property owners are vs. failing to capitalize public debts into transaction values of property?

Liabilities (Working Draft Estimate for EOP 2013)

Chicago and Detroit Liabilities, 2013							
Chicago		Detroit					
Category	Amount	Category	Amount				
Direct and Overlapping Bonded Debt (\$000s)		Direct and Overlapping Gov't Act. Debt (\$000s)					
Net Debt Applicable	18,008,788	Net Debt Applicable	4,105,191				
City of Chicago G.O. Bonds	7,670,298	City of Detroit Direct	2,345,177				
Board of Education	6,207,790	Detroit Public Schools	1,694,187				
Chicago Park District	865,665	Wayne County	63,617				
City Colleges of Chicago	250,000	Wayne County Community College	2,211				
Cook County	1,715,011						
Cook County Forest Preserve	86,091						
Metropolitan Water Reclamation	1,213,933						
Water Revenue Bonds (\$000s)	1,954,020	Water Revenue Bonds (\$000s)	2,524,775				
Wastewater Transmission Revenue Bonds (\$000s)	1,333,984	Sewage Disposal Revenue Bonds (\$000s)	2,824,494				
Pension UAAL (\$000s)	35,041,093	Pension UAAL (\$000s)	3,651,270				
OPEB (\$000s)	106,131	OPEB (\$000s)	5,718,286				
State Teachers' Retirement System (\$000s)	11,770,368						
Commercial Paper Notes (\$000s)	270,188						
Total Debt	68,484,572	Total Debt	18,824,016				


Liabilities (Working Draft Estimate for EOP 2013)

Milwaukee Liabilities, 2013							
Milwaukee							
Category	Amount						
Debt Repaid with Property Taxes (\$000s)							
Total Direct and Overlapping Debt	1,543,855						
Direct Debt	719,242						
Milwaukee Area Tech. Coll. District	42,687						
County of Milwaukee	329,108						
Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Area	452,818						
Water Revenue Bonds (\$000s)	10,836						
Sewage Disposal Revenue Bonds (\$000s)	88,035						
Pension UAAL (\$000s)	429,925						
OPEB (\$000s)	287,460						
State Retirement UAAL (\$000s)	5,537						
Total Debt	2,365,648						

(Preliminary) Realty-Based Value Estimates

With and Without Capitalization


(\$000s per capita)



At end.....

- Property owners apparently see considerable value in the "Chicago franchise" despite mounting debt and the administrative disarray of local and State government
- Some ratings/rankings of city fiscal health may be misleading

Bond Ratings



^{*} Sources: Chicago and Detroit values were obtained from Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports. Milwaukee values are reported in the Office of the Comptroller's official statements on bond issues.