

a visual guide to the State's


biggest financial challenge


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CHAPTER 1

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

Figures are for all five State funds combined (SURS, JRS, GARS, TRS and SERS).





The State of Illinois is currently on a 50-year schedule to reach 90% funded. An actuarially sound pension payment plan calculates annual contributions to achieve a target of 100% funding within, at most, 30 years.

Figures in 1.1 and 1.2 are based on a number of assumptions.

> Notably, all five funds project expected rates of return on investment that are **higher** than their ten-year average actual rate of return.

SECTION 1.3

IMPACT OF PENSIONS ON THE ILLINOIS STATE BUDGET FY2019 General Funds pension spending of S8.4 컶 is expected to represent of state-source revenues.

* FY2019 contributions are subject to change, based on participation in voluntary pension buyout programs. This figure includes pension-related debt service.

The share of revenue available for critical government services continues to shrink.



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CHAPTER 2 WHAT ARE THE DRIVERS & CONSEQUENCES?

SECTION 2.2

SECTION 2.1 UNDERFUNDING

Between FY1996 and FY2018, inadequate State contributions accounted for approximately

> of all growth in the unfunded liability of the State's five pension funds.

SECTION 2.3 ROADBLOCKS TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM

CONSTITUTIONALITY

A clause in the Illinois state constitution says that pension membership is a contractual relationship that shall not be "diminished or impaired".

ILLINOIS COURTS

- Illinois courts have
- ruled that any
- change to existing
- benefits, including to
- automatic annual
- increases,
- is therefore
- unconstitutional.

HOW A DOWNSTATE TEACHER'S ANNUITY GROWS WITH 3% COMPOUNDED AUTOMATIC INCREASE

COMPOUNDING

In 2018, the average downstate teacher retired at **age 61** with a starting annual benefit of **\$55,596**

Base	\$55,596	Year 14	\$81,645
Year 2	\$57,264	Year 15	\$84,094
Year 3	\$58,982	Year 16	\$86,617
Year 4	\$60,751	Year 17	\$89,215
Year 5	\$62,574	Year 18	\$91,892
Year 6	\$64,451	Year 19	\$94,649
Year 7	\$66,385	Year 20	\$97,488
Year 8	\$68,376	Year 21	\$100,413
Year 9	\$70,427	Year 22	\$103,425
Year 10	\$72,540	Year 23	\$106,528
Year 11	\$74,717	Year 24	\$109,724
Year 12	\$76,958	Year 25	\$113,015
Year 13	\$79,267		VII 0,010

The 3% compounded annual increase provided by many funds in Illinois is an expensive benefit, as an employee can effectively **double** their annual benefit within 25 years.

SECTION 2.4 THE BIG CONSEQUENCE: CROWDING OUT

STATE-SOURCE GENERAL FUNDS REVENUE CONSUMED BY PENSION COSTS COMPARED WITH OTHER PURPOSES

Growing pension obligations divert resources away from other critical areas, such as:



^{**}Estimated.



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
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CHAPTER 3 HOW FAR IS ILLINOIS FROM BEST PRACTICES?

SECTION 3.1

MORE OF ILLINOIS' STATE AND LOCAL REVENUE HAS TO GO TO PENSIONS THAN IN OTHER STATES




The ARC is an estimate of what the State **ought** to be paying.

It should be noted that Illinois' FY2018 contribution was only

of its ARC.

Note: Data factored into the above figures includes only the largest state and local pension funds in each state | Source: publicplansdata.org

SECTION 3.2 THE CURRENT PLAN IS NOT SUFFICIENT




THE PLAN TO 90% FUNDED

To achieve the 90% funding goal set by the General Assembly, annual State contributions are currently projected to rise to **\$19.6 billion** in the next 27 years from \$8 billion in FY2018.

PROJECTED UNFUNDED LIABILITY BASED ON STATUTORY CONTRIBUTIONS

Even with those increases, contributions are not expected to be sufficient to keep unfunded liabilities from growing until **FY2029**.





CHAPTER 4

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WHAT HAS BEEN TRIED?

SECTION 4.1 CREATION OF A LOWER TIER OF BENEFITS IN 2010

Tier II applies to all employees hired after 2010. Changes include:

Increased retirement age






Replacement of the 3% compounding automatic increase with simple interest

This new tier of benefits **does not affect** current retirees or employees hired prior to 2011. Consequently, its effect on the State's finances has so far been minor and **most of the savings will come far in the future**.

SECTION 4.2 OTHER ATTEMPTS AT PENSION REFORM





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CHAPTER 5

WHAT'S NEXT? NO EASY OPTIONS.

None of these options are sufficient on their own. Solving the problem will require a mixed approach.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT



The Illinois General Assembly should vote to place a **Constitutional** amendment on the ballot that would clarify the pension protection clause.

BENEFITS

Could pave the way for reducing the 3% compounding automatic increase.

BUYOUTS AND CONSIDERATION



Reforms that ask employees or retirees to **voluntarily** agree to a reduced benefit could be more likely to sustain a constitutional challenge.

BENEFITS

Could result in meaningful progress without requiring changes to existing law.

CAUTION

Any such programs should be subject to a full actuarial analysis before counting on any savings.

PENSION **OBLIGATION BONDS**



The State could **borrow** tens of billions of dollars to invest in the funds.

If the funds were to get

BENEFITS

a higher return on their investment than the interest the State pays on the debt, there would be long-term savings.

CAUTION

This is an extremely risky gamble. Poor returns on investment would effectively add to the State's overall burden. Success relies heavily on market conditions.

REAMORTIZATION



While plans vary, they generally lower the target funded ratio and level out annual contributions over time.

BENEFITS

Creates a more realistic funding plan with lower out-year contributions.

CAUTION

By lowering the target funded ratio, reamortization plans effectively extend unfunded pension liabilities further into the future and make paying for obligations even more **expensive** in the long-run.

REVENUE



It is unlikely that this challenge can be overcome with cuts alone. More revenue will be needed.

OPTIONS INCLUDE:

END THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR RETIREMENT INCOME EST. WORTH IN FY2019 52.5 BILLI 87 FY2023: \$588 MILLION

EXTEND THE SALES TAX **BASE TO** SOME SERVICES EST. WORTH

CAUTION

Any new revenue should be:

- **Balanced** by spending controls
- **Reliable** and sustainable (Unlike taxes on sports gambling or marijuana)



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CHAPTER 6

WHAT ABOUT THE LOCAL CRISES?

SECTION 6.1

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE LOCAL PROBLEM

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM QUINCY to DECATUR

ARE STRUGGLING UNDER THE WEIGHT OF THEIR OWN PENSION CRISES. *Extraordinary measures have become the norm across the state:*

Rockford, Danville, Peoria and many other municipalities have implemented large increases to taxes and fees dedicated to funding their pensions.

Community leaders in **Calumet Park** have even discussed outsourcing fire services as the city struggles to pay the costs associated with its part-time fire department.

In **Alton**, officials are working to sell the water treatment plant to prop up the city's woefully underfunded pension funds. Movement on this extraordinary measure was not even sufficient to save the city from a credit rating downgrade late last year.

SOLUTIONS AND STATE AID

CONSOLIDATION

SECTION 6.2



Consolidation of these pension funds would cut administrative costs and could boost investment returns.

STATE ASSISTANCE TO AVOID BANKRUPTCY



The Civic Federation proposes a

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY that could provide expert assistance to ailing Illinois local governments

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